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The study of monetary policy interaction in open economies is typically undertaken
within environments in which international economic integration is given - either goods
are all traded or some goods are nontradable by assumption. In this paper, a sim-
ple two country general equilibrium model with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity is developed
to study the joint determination of long-run inﬂation and international economic in-
tegration. There are two main ﬁndings. Monetary policy is more aggressive when
economic integration is endogenous resulting in higher long-run inﬂation. The long-
run welfare costs of inﬂation are magniﬁed and this generates increased gains from
monetary cooperation.
I consider a world economy in which each country is specialized in producing one good
and each ﬁrm within a country produces one diﬀerentiated variety and competes in a
monopolistically competitive market. Firms diﬀer in their productivity but incur a
common ﬁxed cost of exporting so that only an endogenous subset of ﬁrms export.1
Firms also fund working capital - which is complementary to labor - by borrowing from
ﬁnancial intermediaries.2 When deciding on monetary policy in this environment, each
government must consider how inﬂation aﬀects the allocation of resources across ﬁrms
within countries and the extent of economic integration between countries.
Without international trade (and with trade, but when countries cooperate over mone-
1These assumptions are made in the spirit of Melitz (2003). His theoretical analysis is motivated
by empirical evidence that exporting ﬁrms are larger and more productive than non-exporters and
that ﬁrms self-select into international trade. See Bernard and Jensen (1999), and more recently,
Bernard et al. (2007).
2Working capital plays an important role over the business cycle. See Christiano et al. (2005) and
Jermann and Quadrini (2011) and also the models of Fuerst (1992), Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1995),
and Christiano et al. (1997).
1tary arrangements) each government attempts to stimulate economic activity and raise
output by lowering the interest rate. The Friedman rule is optimal. With trade in va-
rieties - but when resource allocation and international economic integration are given
- there is potential for policy competition between countries because each government
can inﬂate, reduce own output, and inﬂuence the terms of trade. The extent to which
governments inﬂate depends on the monopoly distortion in supply. With a relatively
high distortion, the welfare gains from inﬂuencing the terms of trade are outweighed
by the ineﬃciencies associated with higher long-run inﬂation, and the Friedman rule
remains optimal.
When economic integration is endogenous there is an additional incentive to inﬂate.
Inﬂating makes it more expensive for an individual ﬁrm to export their variety and
raises the level of productivity required for a ﬁrm to generate positive export proﬁts.
In this case, when a country inﬂates, a smaller subset of ﬁrms choose to export, re-
sources are re-allocated to these more productive ﬁrms, and average productivity rises
across the export sector. In addition to reducing own output, optimal non-cooperative
monetary policy dictates that each country reduce the proportion of ﬁrms that enter
the export market.
The channel that generates inﬂation in my model has important implications for the
welfare gains from monetary cooperation. First, the welfare gain from cooperation
is greater because policy competition is more aggressive. Second, for a given level of
inﬂation, the welfare gain is greater the more ﬁrms export. The reason is the follow-
ing: the greater the proportion of ﬁrms that export, the more scope the policy maker
has to inﬂate. Because inﬂating reduces the number of imported products available
to the consumer, the negative welfare impact of inﬂation is magniﬁed. Endogenis-
ing international economic integration and resource allocation across ﬁrms therefore
2generates higher inﬂation and increases the long-run welfare losses associated with
non-cooperative policy.
This paper is related to two diﬀerent strands of research in international macroeco-
nomics. One strand seeks to understand the reasons for systematic inﬂation when
countries interact. For example, Cooley and Quadrini (2003) argue that policy com-
petition between countries leads to inﬂation with large welfare losses.3 Arseneau
(2007) shows that suﬃciently large monopoly distortions can generate policies that
coincide with the cooperative outcome. In this context, ﬁrm-level heterogeneity has
important implications. It overturns the dampening eﬀect of domestic monopoly dis-
tortions and generates a novel link between productivity and long-run inﬂation. A
second strand of related research demonstrates how ﬁrm-level heterogeneity can have
important macroeconomic implications because it generates endogenous tradability -
for example, see Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Bergin and Glick (2007, 2009), Naknoi
(2008), and Devereux and Hnatkovska (2011). However, this research does not con-
sider how heterogeneity might alter policy decisions, which is the focus of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a two-country
monetary model with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. In sections 3 and 4 the model solu-
tion is presented and optimal non-cooperative policy and the welfare loss from non-
cooperation are deﬁned. The results are presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2. The World Economy
3The natural alternative - summarized in Corsetti et al. (2011) - focuses on short-run stabilization
policies and argues that the beneﬁts of monetary cooperation are small (also see Pappa and Liu (2008)
for an analysis of optimal stabilization policy with an exogenous non-traded sector). However, Cooley
and Quadrini (2003) also show that the long-term welfare beneﬁts of monetary cooperation dominate
those associated with losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.
3The world consists of two identical economies each populated with a continuum of
agents of unit mass. Households supply labor, make deposits with ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, and consume domestic and foreign goods, subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
In each country a unit mass of ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products using labor. Firms
are heterogenous in productivity, incur a ﬁxed cost of exporting, and borrow from ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries to fund working capital. Each government controls the money
supply through lump-sum transfers. Consumption, output and the nominal price of
the domestic output are denoted with h-subscripts. Foreign consumption, output and
prices are denoted with f-subscripts. Asterisks denote foreign economy variables.
2.1. Households Intratemporal Consumption Decision
Households total consumption is a Cobb-Douglas composite of bundles of varieties of















where ch,t (a) is the consumption of a good produced by a ﬁrm with productivity
a in the home economy, cf,t (a⋆) is the consumption of a good produced by a ﬁrm
with productivity a⋆ in the foreign economy (of which N⋆
t are available to the home
consumer), σ = 1/(1   ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of
goods and the elasticity of substitution across the bundles of home and foreign goods
is unity. The parameter θ measures openness to trade in varieties and is symmetric
across the two economies, where Θ  θθ (1   θ)
1 θ. The consumer price index is










4With preferences of this form, household consumption is characterized by standard downward-









Ct. Normalizing the measure of domestically produced goods in each economy
has no implications for the results.
42.2. Firm Pricing and Productivity Threshold
Each ﬁrm faces a ﬁnancing constraint in that the current wage bill must be paid for
with loans from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Loans are made at the gross nominal interest
rate, Rt, and are repaid at the end of the period. Firms produce without overhead
costs and labor is the only factor of production. Exporting is costly because there
are per-unit iceberg costs and labor-intensive ﬁxed costs. For a ﬁrm with a linear
technology and labor productivity a, proﬁts from domestic sales can be written as,
















h,t (a)   FWtRt (2)
where F  0 denotes the ﬁxed cost associated with exporting and τ denotes the
iceberg cost such that for y⋆
h,t (a) = γl⋆
h,t (a) units produced γl⋆
h,t (a)/τ units are sold
and generate revenue and et is the nominal exchange rate. The nominal interest rate
appears both in the term capturing the costs of production and the term capturing
ﬁxed costs because ﬁrms are assumed to borrow the total wage bill.
The ﬁrm maximizes discounted total proﬁts, E0
∑1
t=0 (βt+1/Ct+1Pt+1)φt (a), where
φt (a)  φh,t (a) + φ⋆
h,t (a), subject to the (home and foreign) demand for it’s product
and the goods market constraints, yh,t (a) = ch,t (a) and y⋆
h,t (a) = τc⋆
h,t (a). The
optimal prices chosen by the home ﬁrm for the domestic and export market are,
ph,t (a) = WtRt/ρa and p⋆
h,t (a) = (τ/et)ph,t (a), where ρ is the inverse monopoly
markup.
Given the optimal pricing decisions of ﬁrms, there is a zero-proﬁt, threshold level of
productivity for exporting, denoted ax,t = inf
{
a : φ⋆
h,t (a) > 0
}
. The threshold level
of productivity is characterized by, r⋆
h,t (a)/θ  FWtRt, where, r⋆
h,t (a) denotes home
ﬁrm-level export revenue. When F > 0, this condition admits an explicit expression



















When F = 0, all ﬁrms export, and the threshold level of productivity is irrelevant.
2.3. Productivity Draws and Aggregation




where g (a) is a probability density function. The weighted-average productivity for






, where 1   G(ax,t) is the
probability of exporting, and G(a) is the cumulative distribution function. I assume
productivity is Pareto distributed, where G(a) = 1   a γ, with a > 1. The shape
parameter, γ, indexes the dispersion (of productivity), and characterizes ﬁrm hetero-
geneity. Since a is Pareto, I can solve for the weighted-average productivity of all ﬁrms
as, A = fγ/[γ   (σ   1)]g
1/(σ 1). In the same way, the weighted-average productiv-
ity for ﬁrms that export is, at = Aax,t, so that at is proportional to the endogenous
productivity cutoﬀ deﬁned by equation (3).
I aggregate ﬁrm-level variables using productivity averages. For example, consider
the domestic currency price of the domestic product, ph,t (a), and deﬁne the average






where ph,t (a) = WtRt/ρa, we can write ph,t = WtRt/ρA, where A is consistent with
the deﬁnition introduced above. This average price is linked to the consumer price,
Ph,t. In this case, because there are a measure one of ﬁrms, Ph,t = ph,t. The same
aggregation can be applied to all ﬁrm-level variables.
2.4. Household Financial Deposits and Labor Supply
Households intertemporal utility is
∑1
t=0 βtu(Ct,Lt), where Lt is the total supply of
labor. Utility from consumption is increasing, concave, and continuously diﬀerentiable
6and disutility of work is increasing, convex, and continuously diﬀerentiable. At the
beginning of a period, households deposit cash with domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Any remaining cash is used for (total) consumption, subject to the following cash-in-
advance constraint,
PtCt  WtLt + Mt   Dt (4)
where Dt > Mt are household deposits of cash with intermediaries and WtLt is nominal
labor income. The accumulation of cash (i.e., the cash the consumer has at the end-
of-period t/beginning-of-period t + 1) is,
Mt+1  WtLt + Dtit + φt + ζt   PtCt + Mt (5)
where ζt are proﬁts of ﬁnancial intermediaries and it = Rt   1 > 0 is the net nominal
interest rate. Households maximize lifetime utility subject to these two constraints
and the ﬁrst-order conditions imply the following.












where wt  Wt/Pt is the real wage and subscripts denote the derivative of the utility
function with respect to that variable. The ﬁrst expression is a condition for the
labor-leisure trade-oﬀ. The second expression is an Euler equation in consumption.
Household savings are made entirely through the domestic ﬁnancial intermediary and
the expectations term, Et 1, appears in the Euler equation because household deposits
with ﬁnancial intermediaries are predetermined.
2.5. Equilibrium
7Financial intermediaries receive cash from households and from the government, which
total Dt + Tt. They make loans to ﬁrms at the net interest rate. At the end of the
period, intermediaries pay interest on loans back to households, so the total amount
households receive at the end of the period is, Rt(Tt + Dt), and the proﬁt of ﬁnancial
intermediaries is, ζt = RtTt. Equilibrium in the ﬁnancial sector is such that, WtLt =
Dt + Tt, and when the government has access to lump-sum transfers and taxes, Tt =
gMt, where 1 + g  Mt+1/Mt is the rate of money growth.
Resource use (labor) in the economy can characterized as,
ALt = θq
1 θ


















where the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of equation (8) capture the use of
labor for production and F (at/A)
γ is the use of labor by exporting ﬁrms to cover ﬁxed
costs. The variables qt  Pf,t/Ph,t and q⋆
t  P ⋆
f,t/P ⋆
h,t are relative prices.
There is no international trade in ﬁnancial assets (ﬁnancial autarky) and balanced







t /Pt is the consumer-based real exchange rate.
3. Model Solution
In this section I characterize the model solution. Since I focus on the systematic inﬂa-
tion generated from interaction between countries, I write the households consumption
Euler equation as π = βR   1. This states that higher inﬂation is associated with
higher nominal interest rates. Eliminating wages in the remaining conditions above
generates conditions that solve for fC,L,q,a,Rg and their foreign counterparts as a
function of money growth. In table 1, I present the model equations for the home
8economy with the understanding that there are four additional equations describing
resources, the labor market, a cash-to-loans ratio, and productivity, for the foreign
economy.
===== Table 1 Here =====
The variable d  D/M is the stock of ﬁnancial assets held by households in domestic




)1/(σ 1) > 0 is a composite parameter.
We can use the conditions in table 1 to understand how the distortions present in
each economy inﬂuence the government’s non-cooperative policy decision. Because
the stock of deposits is decided upon at the end of the period - and households wait
until the end of the following period before changing their deposits - monetary policy
generates a liquidity eﬀect. If the economy were closed to trade, this liquidity channel
would be the only mechanism through which the nominal interest rate aﬀected the real
sector of the economy (to see this, set q = A = a = 1 in the ﬁrst three equations
and ignore the ﬁnal three). In a closed economy, it is optimal for the government to
lower interest rates, reduce the monetary distortion, and raise output to the perfectly
competitive level. However, this is not feasible because of the zero lower bound on
interest rates. Thus, optimal policy sets the interest rate at zero (with deﬂation at
the rate of time preference) consistent with the Friedman rule.
When there is trade in varieties, monetary policy aﬀects the macroeconomy through
changes in relative prices, q and q⋆. For example, a monetary contraction reduces the
interest rate and induces an appreciation of the domestic currency. This generates a
reduction in the level of domestic activity, controlling for the negative liquidity eﬀect.
Other open economy models, such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Cooley and
9Quadrini (2003), also emphasize this channel of monetary transmission, and here it
is a source of policy competition (this result can be recovered from table 1, now by
including the ﬁnal two equations, setting C = C⋆ and (q/q⋆)
1/2 = τ, whilst maintaining
A = a = 1). To take advantage of favorable movements in the terms of trade countries
need to reduce own output. This generates a trade-oﬀ between manipulating the
terms of trade and reducing the monetary distortion which depends on the size of the
monopoly distortion.
The terms of trade channel just described generates one conﬂict of interest between
the two countries. However, this conﬂict is not the only basis for policy competition
because monetary policy also aﬀects the allocation of resources and the extent of eco-
nomic integration. In this case, a monetary contraction raises the costs of exporting,
and since it is more expensive to export, less ﬁrms do so. Because only the most pro-
ductive ﬁrms export, the ﬁrms that leave the export market are, by deﬁnition, those
with lower levels of productivity. Thus, the average level of productivity of ﬁrms
that exports must rise (the average level of productivity of ﬁrms across the economy
is unaltered) and resources are re-allocated to the remaining exporting ﬁrms. In my
model, this source of policy competition generates additional inﬂation with quantita-
tively important welfare consequences.
4. Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section I derive the constraints faced by the policy maker in terms of the nominal
interest rate, which is the policy variable.5 I also deﬁne optimal monetary policy when
each government acts independently and the welfare loss from not cooperating.
5In the Appendix, I show for a given stock of deposits, that the speciﬁcation of the monetary policy
instrument in terms of money growth rates or interest rates is equivalent. After this, I derive the
constraints presented in this section.
104.1. Policy Constraints
I focus on the home economy and start by deriving a constraint for the labor market.
The home country’s total supply of labor can be expressed in terms of consumption,
for a given policy, as,
(ρ + ϵ)CuC (C,L) + RLuL (C,L) = 0 (10)
The term ϵ  (1   θ)[1   ρ(1 + 1/γ)] in equation (10) results entirely from ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity, where γ > σ > 1 indexes the dispersion of productivity, and 1 < ρ =
(σ   1)/σ < 1 is the inverse monopoly markup. There is no trade in varieties when
θ = 1, and then ϵ = 0.
Given the labor market constraint, I express total consumption in terms of the total
labor supplied in each economy, L and L⋆. Home consumption is a weighted-average





where χ > 0 and η > 1. Again, both of these parameters result from ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity. The parameter χ is a function of iceberg and ﬁxed costs of exporting
and η  1/µ   (1   1/ρ), where µ = γ/(γ   1)  1 is the arithmetic mean of the
Pareto distribution. Recall, that preferences over total consumption (see equation
(1)) are speciﬁed as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1974). In this case, the parameter σ denotes
the elasticity of intratemporal substitution (i.e., across varieties) and 1/ρ   1 is the
marginal utility gain from spreading a given amount of consumption on a basket with
an additional variety in a symmetric equilibrium. We can therefore think of η > 1 as
capturing heterogeneity-adjusted love-of-variety.
4.2. Non-Cooperative Monetary Policy
11When monetary policy is set non-cooperatively, the problem for the home government
is to pick R  1 to maximize u(C,L), subject to (10), (11), and their foreign coun-
terparts, taking R⋆ as given. Similarly, the foreign government maximizes u(C⋆,L⋆),
picking R⋆  1, subject to it’s constraints, taking R as given. Given that home and
foreign interest rates are independent, we already know that the reaction function of
each government is independent of the other government’s policy variable. Since the
economies are identical, we also know R = R⋆, in equilibrium. From here on, I denote
the outcome of non-cooperative policy by R.
4.3. Welfare Loss from Non-Cooperation
When governments cooperate, I assume a supranational agency controls both policy
instruments and maximizes a weighted average of home and foreign consumers utility.
The policy problem is to pick interest rates to maximize (1/2)u(C,L)+(1/2)u(C⋆,L⋆),
subject to the same constraints as the non-cooperative case. Under cooperation,
the supra-national agency acts as if it were running a closed economy and attempts
to push the interest rate down, eliminating the monetary and monopoly distortions.
However, given the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the government
cannot eliminate the monopoly distortion in an equilibrium with commitment. Because
cooperation removes the channels that provide an incentive for each government to
engage in policy competition, the Friedman rule is optimal.
The potential welfare loss from not cooperating - denoted by L - is deﬁned by the
additional consumption required to make individuals equally well-oﬀ under cooperative
or non-cooperative policy. In particular, L is the increase in steady-state consumption
an individual would require when policy is non-cooperative, to be as well-oﬀ as under
the Friedman rule. The welfare loss from non-cooperation is implicitly deﬁned by,
u((1 + L)C (R),L(R)) = u(C (1),L(1)) (12)
12where C () and L() are the associated allocations of consumption and labor in each
regime, i.e., R or 1.
5. Results
In this section I discuss the role of resource allocation and endogenous economic in-
tegration in generating inﬂation and welfare losses from non-cooperative policy. I
then calibrate the model and present a quantitative analysis of the welfare loss from
non-cooperation.
5.1. Economic Integration and Firm-Level Heterogeneity
I ﬁrst adopt a simple speciﬁcation for preferences that allows an analytical solution
to the government’s policy problem. I assume the utility function of the household
has the following form: u(C,L) = lnC + ln(1   L). This implies the intertemporal
substitution of consumption and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply are both equal




1 σ)/2, so that relative
consumption is solely a function of exporter productivity levels. Under these condi-
tions, there is always policy competition between countries and inﬂation is above the








There are two elements to (13): the inverse monopoly markup, 0 < ρ < 1, and the
mean of the Pareto distribution, µ = γ/(γ   1)  1. Recall that the parameter
γ indexes the dispersion of productivity, and as γ rises, ﬁrm-level productivity is less
dispersed, and the mean of the distribution approaches one.6 Thus, higher inﬂation
6We can also relate this parameter to the empirical standard deviation of sales (output), which





. I use this deﬁnition to calibrate the model. From a qualitative
perspective, both terms measure the dispersion of productivity and fall with .
13is consistent with lower average productivity/less dispersed productivity at the ﬁrm
level, as measured by µ or A. The explanation for this result derives from the fraction
of exporting ﬁrms in each economy. Less productive economies have a greater number
(of smaller) exporters. With a higher fraction of exporters, there is a greater incentive
for the government to manipulate relative prices, and more scope to use policy to
re-allocate resources to the most productive ﬁrms.
It is also possible to understand this result by relating it to the case when economic
integration between countries is given. Even in the presence on non-zero ﬁxed costs, for
a suﬃciently high γ, all ﬁrms export. However, one cannot simply set µ = 1 because
this case also requires a = a⋆
x ! 1 such that the threshold productivity for an individual
ﬁrm to export approaches the minimum draw from the Pareto distribution. I therefore
impose A = a = 1. Inﬂation can then be written as π = β2ρ   1. This condition
shows why endogenous economic integration and resource allocation matter. For
certain conﬁgurations (in this particular case, when 0 < ρ < 1/2), the Friedman rule is
optimal because the trade-oﬀ the government faces when setting policy is determined
by the extent of competition in the product market. When policy aﬀects the allocation
of resources across ﬁrms, inﬂation is always above the Friedman rule.
I now analyze how policy competition feeds into the welfare losses arising from non-


















The ﬁrst term in (14) captures the diﬀerences in labor supplied across regimes (i.e.,
with cooperative and non-cooperative policies). The second term is the consumption
diﬀerence across regimes. Notice that the consumption diﬀerence contains a hetero-
geneity term in the exponent - speciﬁcally η > 1 - and the long-run welfare losses are
14driven by international economic integration for two reasons. First, long-run inﬂation,
which aﬀects both consumption and labor supplied, is higher. Second, households
access a varying subset of foreign products. The second loss in welfare reﬂects the
love-of-variety by households, adjusted for the fact that traded varieties are supplied
by ﬁrms that are heterogeneous in productivity.
To isolate this additional welfare eﬀect, I decompose the loss from non-cooperation
into two parts by re-writing (14) as, 1 + L = R(1+η)/2 [3/(2 + R)]
1+(1+η)/2. The ﬁrst
part of this new expression derives from the negative impact of higher interest rates on
welfare. Recall that a lower µ means more ﬁrms export, and from (13), this leads to
higher interest rates (R = (1 + π)/β) and greater losses from non-cooperation. The
second part results from the eﬀect on consumption, for a given policy. Recall that
η = 1/µ (1   1/ρ). Holding the interest rate constant, L falls with µ. Thus, changing
heterogeneity has complementary eﬀects. A lower µ is consistent with higher long-
term inﬂation when countries set policy independently, and for a given rate of inﬂation,
lower levels of µ generate greater welfare losses from non-cooperative policy.
The mechanism that generates inﬂation in this model works alongside a more standard
one. For a given measure of traded goods, each government will attempt to inﬂate, and
manipulate the terms of trade. Since this represents an attempt to push output down,
there is a reduction in the intensive margin of trade. With ﬁrm-level heterogeneity,
policy also works along the extensive margin of trade (i.e. changes in the fraction of
ﬁrms that export, for a given export volume per-ﬁrm). This captures the extent of
international economic integration. Optimal non-cooperative policy dictates that, in
addition to reducing own output, each country should also reduce the proportion of
ﬁrms that export. This dual role for policy in aﬀecting the margins of trade is the
reason there are direct and indirect long-run welfare implications of inﬂation.
155.2. Calibration and Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model and quantify the welfare losses from non-cooperation.
I ﬁrst set the model parameters to match some simple stylized facts assuming that coun-
tries cooperate. I then determine the optimal policy when countries act independently
and calculate the allocations associated with this policy. Finally, I change the degree
of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity to determine how this aﬀects policy competition and the
associated long-term welfare loss. Changing ﬁrm-level heterogeneity aﬀects the allo-
cations when there is monetary cooperation, although it does not change the policy
decision, and it changes optimal policy when countries act independently.
I also generalize the utility function used above in two ways. First, I assume the
parameter ξ > 0 determines whether goods are substitutes or complements in util-
ity. In my model, two goods are substitutes - i.e., the marginal utility of one good
decreases with the consumption of the other good - when the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution is less than the elasticity of intratemporal substitution. Because the
intertemporal elasticity is 1/ξ and the intratemporal elasticity is 1, home and foreign
goods are substitutes when ξ > 1.7 Second, I allow ψ > 1 to determine the weight of
leisure in utility so that I can match the model to hours worked.
I calibrate the model so a period corresponds to one quarter and set β = 0.995. I
assume a price markup for ﬁrms of 30% over marginal costs and set σ = 4.33. To
match the model with ﬁrm-level data I assume the standard deviation of output is
1.67, consistent with Bernard et al. (2003). In my model, this statistic is given by
7In my model, the easiest way to understand why the substitutability of goods in utility matters
is by noticing that when  = 1, the impact of changing policy on exporting is independent of changes
in consumption. This is a type of ‘no international spillover’ result: home policy aﬀects foreign
consumption, but since foreign consumption does not aﬀect the fraction of foreign ﬁrms that export,
there are no implications from policy.
161/(γ   σ + 1), and given the ﬁrms price markup, this further implies µ = 1.34 and
A = 1.76. I also assume per-unit trade cost of approximately 16%, which implies
setting τ = 1.2, that consumers allocate 25% of their consumption expenditure to
traded goods originating from abroad, which is a measure of home-bias in traded
consumption baskets, and that home and foreign goods are mild complements in utility,
with ξ = 0.9. Finally, I calibrate the ﬁxed export cost so the proportion of exporting
plants matches the ﬁgure of 21% reported in Bernard et al. (2003), which implies
F = 0.016, and calibrate the weight placed on leisure in utility so individuals spend
30% of their time endowment working, which implies ψ = 1.66.
In table 2, I present the welfare loss from non-cooperation along with the annual rate
of inﬂation and the exporter productivity premium for diﬀering degrees of ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity, as measured by 1/(γ   σ + 1).
===== Table 2 Here =====
The welfare loss from non-cooperation in the benchmark case is 2.6% of annual steady
state consumption. Table 2 also shows the welfare loss from non-cooperation (inﬂa-
tion) rises (is higher) the more homogenous are ﬁrms. Intuitively this seems surprising,
because higher interest rates and inﬂation reduce the proportion of ﬁrms that export.
However, there are two opposing eﬀects on the exporting decision of ﬁrms when pro-
ductivity dispersion changes. One is generated through induced policy changes, which
itself depends on the economic integration between economies. The second eﬀect
depends on the impact of changes in productivity dispersion, independent of policy.
Higher inﬂation with more exporters (a lower exporter premium) is explained by the
dominant role of productivity dispersion on the decision of ﬁrms to export.
17When all varieties are traded, and the allocation of resources is ﬁxed, the long-run
welfare loss associated with non-cooperative policy (not reported in table 2) is 1.51%
of annual consumption. This is less than when policy aﬀects the allocation of resources
and economic integration is endogenous in the benchmark case and also less than when
the exporter productivity premium is high and very few ﬁrms export. Consider the
ﬁnal column/row of table 2, which shows how much more productive exporters are
compared to the economy-wide average in the most extreme case considered. The
exporter productivity premium is inversely related to the fraction of ﬁrms that export
and with a few highly productive export ﬁrms policy competition is less aggressive
for the reasons explained above. Nevertheless, additional policy competition still
generates a greater welfare loss than with ﬁxed resource usage.
The quantitative results in this section can also be considered more broadly in the
context of the literature on the gains from international monetary coordination, which
assumes international economic integration is given. Cooley and Quadrini (2003), for
example, argue the welfare loss from non-cooperation when governments commit to
policy is less than one percent of annual steady state consumption.8 In the benchmark
case, where the standard deviation of ﬁrms sales is set at 1.67, the welfare loss from
non-cooperation in my model is over three and a half times greater (and proportionally
higher than the diﬀerence in inﬂation). One conclusion from this is that when the
allocation of resources across exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms is endogenous the
adverse welfare implications of non-cooperative policy are quantitatively important.
5. Conclusion
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a two country general equilibrium model
8Absent endogenous economic integration, this ﬁgure is still half that generated by my model.
This is a result of endogenous labor supply.
18where international economic integration is endogenised through ﬁrm-level heterogene-
ity and monopolistic competition. Economic integration between countries is a source
of policy competition, generating higher long-run inﬂation, and increased gains from
monetary cooperation. The gains from cooperating are greater in economies where
many ﬁrms export because resources use is not concentrated among the most pro-
ductive ﬁrms. From a quantitative perspective, the benchmark welfare loss from
non-cooperation is around two and a half percent of annual steady state consumption.
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21Table 1: Model Equations for Home Economy
Resources AL = Cq1 θ + AF (A/a)
γ
Labor Market uC ()ρAqθ 1 + uL ()R = 0
Cash-to-Loans uC ()C (d + µ) + uL ()L(1 + µ) = 0
Productivity a + (Aω/ρ)[uL ()R/uC ()C]



















22Table 2: Welfare Loss without Monetary Cooperation
Firm Heterogeneity .5 1 1.67 2 5 10
Welfare Loss 4.41 3.21 2.60 2.43 1.91 1.72
Ination 17.52 12.92 10.47 9.79 7.52 6.69
Productivity Premium 16.41 36.75 52.23 60.01 109.75 159.41
23Appendix
Here I show that using the nominal interest rate or money growth rate are equivalent
monetary policies. I also solve for consumption and labor supplied as a function of
home and foreign nominal interest rates. I focus on the home economy.
A.1. Interest Rate Policy
I ﬁrst use wuC (C,L)+uL (C,L) = 0 and it’s foreign counterpart to write the equations
in table 1 in terms of wages. Then deﬁne (for some variable, x) xR  x/x⋆ as
‘relative’ x, and xW  (xx⋆)
1/2 as ‘world’ x. Using these deﬁnitions, the equations

























where λ1  (Aω/ρ)(1/ρA)
θ/(1 θ). Next, using the ratio of labor demands and balanced
trade, I solve for productivity levels and home consumption as functions of the relative


























. The two equations in (A2) along with (A1) also
determine CR and CW as a function of real wages and nominal interest rates. Taking
the ratio of these conditions and plugging the solution (for a/C) into the cash-to-
loans ratio and resource constraint there is a unique relationship between the domestic
growth rate of money and the domestic interest rate. In this case, choosing the nominal
interest rate or money growth rate are equivalent policies (R⋆ and g⋆ are equivalent
policies for the foreign government), and I can treat R as the choice variable for the
home government with g determined residually. This result is independent of the
speciﬁcation of utility.
24A.2. Constraints on Monetary Policy
I now solve for home consumption and labor supplied as functions of home and foreign
interest rates. Taking the ratios and weighted averages of the solution for a/C and
it’s foreign counterpart, and eliminating wages by using the labor leisure trade-oﬀ I
generate equation (10) in the text. If I eliminate the terms wRRR and wWRW in the






















1 σ) 1 and {  { (λ1,λ2). I convert the expressions
in (A3) to solve for home consumption using C = CW (
CR)1/2. Doing so generates
equation (11) in the main text.
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